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Abstract: As part of a research about Hungarian academic start-ups, I made a 
survey examining part of the answers of a long questionnaire created for the whole 
research filled in by academic spin-offs of most important Hungarian universities. 
The study is structured as follows. First I will present the most important operational 
information on university spin-off companies taking part in the research. Then I will 
give an insight to the details of financing spin-offs, thoroughly analyzing the 
institutional and the non-institutional venture capital and the role of funding 
opportunities – applications. I examine which financing sources dominate in 
academic spin-off companies, what are the experiences of the spin-offs in the fiel of 
the three financial sources mentioned before, in order to be able to answer how 
would what kind of changes would be needed to subserve venture capital financing 
Hungarian spin offs, with high growth potentional. The study ends with a summary. 
 
JEL classification: G24, venture capital 
 
1. Introduction 
The goal of our research was to assess, get to know as widely as possible the 
pioneering national university spin-off companies. As a first step, based on the 
definitions found in the professional literature we created our own definition, which 
we used throughout the assessment. During the research we considered companies 
of founders who have developed technologies or created research results through 
their university work and utilized these within them – as spin-off companies. The 
determination follows the narrower interpretations. The researcher had to be a 
university associate in the moment of company foundation, however it was not 
expected from them to give up their academic careers. Moreover, we did not expect 
from the parent-university to have a formal connection (ownership or contractual) 
with the company. Concerning the immaterial means passed to the spin-off 
companies we also applied limitations: it had to be the passing of an intellectual 
property based on some kind of new technology and/or a codified knowledge. The 
parent institution had to be a state university.2  
The assessments were taking place in four large university cities, in Budapest, 
Debrecen, Pécs and Szeged. There is no available integrated database, statistics 
on the national spin-off companies, which made the research difficult, therefore as a 
second step we developed a database. To identify potential university spin-off 
companies the researchers participating in the research used their own personal 
contact systems, the university technology-transfer offices, as well as internet 
sources. During the implementation we succeeded in identifying 80 university spin-
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off companies, and half of them, 40 companies we successfully involved in the 
personal queries. According to our estimations, we succeeded in identifying half of 
the national university spin-off companies in line with our definition. We layered the 
sample based on the geographic locations of the companies’ real activities, 40% of 
the queries are located in Budapest, while 20%-20% to the provincial cities.  
During the research we implemented a questionnaire-based personal query. The 
third step examined the composed questionnaires, beside the companies’ basic 
information (company name, headquarters, year of foundation, sector of activity, 
knowledge-intensive industry, information from annual reports), also the innovative 
activities and intellectual portfolio, the founder researcher as a person, his/her 
motivations, social capital, and the companies’ connection and cooperation with the 
parent-institution. Moreover, information on the companies’ functioning, growth, 
performance and financing were also subjects of detailed analysis. For the 
uppermost accuracy we tried to make the personal interviews with the founder 
university researchers in all cases, the queries lasted for 45-60 minutes in average. 
Hereinafter we will present the main empirical results from 38 filled questionnaires3.   
 
2. The Hungarian university spin-off companies’ activities 
The Figure 1 shows the number of Hungarian spin-off companies participating in the 
assessment by the year of foundation and knowledge-intensive activity sectors. As 
indicated on the diagram, more than half of the companies participating in our 
research were founded between 2006 and 2008, right before the outburst of the 
global economic crisis, mainly in the field of information communication technologies 
and biotechnology. Until 2003 university spin-off companies were founded solely in 
the fields of biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry, medical science and 
diagnosis, as well as information communication technologies. From 2004 the range 
of new companies got more colorful by chemical industry, consulting and services, 
engineering inventions, micro and nanotechnologies, other natural sciences, as well 
as electronics.  
We can see reduction of the number of company startups, which can be partially 
explained by the crisis, which have started in 2008 and escalated in 2009, which 
influenced the financing of universities on one hand, and on the other led to the 
drying out of the funding sources that were abundantly available in the period of 
2004-2007, after the enforcement of the act on research and development and 
innovation.  
The 59,5% of the questioned companies develop products based on new technology 
and sell them to business consumers and 51,4% provide innovative services for 
business consumers, therefore more than a half of the companies apply the B2B 
(business to business) business model. Compared to the previous a lot less 27% 
and 24,3% from the same activities sell directly to the consumers in other words they 
apply the B2C (business to consumer) model. Only 13,5% of the companies sell new 
(basic) technologies. (Figure 2) 
 
 
                                                   
3 Two companies were excluded from the sample since they did not comply with our 
definition.  
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Figure 1: The number of Hungarian university spin-off companies by 
knowledge-intensive activity sectors and the year of foundation in 2012 
(pc) 
 
 
Source: own compilation 
 
The 59,5% of the questioned companies develop products based on new technology 
and sell them to business consumers and 51,4% provide innovative services for 
business consumers, therefore more than a half of the companies apply the B2B 
(business to business) business model. Compared to the previous a lot less 27% 
and 24,3% from the same activities sell directly to the consumers in other words they 
apply the B2C (business to consumer) model. Only 13,5% of the companies sell new 
(basic) technologies. (Figure 2) 
 
  Figure 2: Activity nature of the Hungarian university spin-off companies (%) 
  
Source: own compilation 
Comment: multiple answers allowed 
 
The main markets of the companies based on the current or planned revenue are 
shown on the Figure 3 97,3% of the respondents ticked Asia, 73% Hungary, 30-50% 
European countries, but North America counts or could count as a market only for 
one third of the companies. The Northern European countries, Africa, Australia, etc. 
were in the other category, and it was ticked by almost all respondents just like Asia.  
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Figure 3: Target markets of the Hungarian university spin-off companies (% of 
those selecting the certain market) 
  
Source: own compilation 
 
3.   The financing of Hungarian university spin-off companies 
The Table 1 shows the percentage of the companies within the sample reporting to 
have been received financial support in the given phase of growth. Since the current 
phase of lifecycle is different among the companies, hence the company being in an 
early phase could not have chosen an answer of e.g. financial support for expansion, 
but the data in the columns can be compared with each other. Two-thirds of the 
companies used their own savings in the seed period, while one-third received non-
refundable financial support from the state. The companies that financed their 
activities through involving a foreign capital or an angel investor or a close family 
member, also reached the high percentage of 22,2%.  
In the start-up phase the non-refundable financial sources got the most scores as 
financing sources (41,7%), the own savings got the second place (36,1%). The 
sequence is very similar among other companies being in other early stages or early 
expansion, where the respondents ranked 33,3% and 19,4% the above mentioned 
sources. In the phase of expansion most of them selected the non-refundable 
sources, but the own savings were preceded by close family members and financing 
through customers. By the way, financing through customers in all phases indicated 
16,7%.  
In the start-up period the venture capital financing received the highest proportion, 
which were followed by the period of early growth and seed, but in the expansion 
period non of the companies received venture capital. Financing through distant 
family members, friends, other non-financial companies and suppliers were selected 
in little number, and an even smaller proportion chose the refundable state support 
(e.g. preferential loans), parent companies as well as short term and long term bank 
loans. The short term bank loans were selected in the early growing stages, while 
the long term bank loans in the start-up phases in 13,9% and 11,1%. The 
significance of university sources is similarly low, it only got over 10% in the seed 
phase. Overall, the Hungarian spin-off companies within the sample primarily rely on 
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own resources and non-refundable state funds in financing their activities, and the 
3F-s’ role is also significant (family, friends, fools – i.e. strangers) in the seed and 
start-up phases. 
 
 
Table 1: Financing sources of the Hungarian spin-off companies in the 
various phases of their lifecycle (proportion of those indicating the given 
answer compared to the total number of responents, %)  
 
Financial sources Seed Start-up Other 
early 
Expansion 
Stranger individual/external 
capital/angel investor 
22,2 13,9 2,8 2,8 
Distant family members, 
friends 
2,8 0 2,8 2,8 
Close family members 22,2 11,1 5,6 16,7 
Own savings 66,7 36,1 19,4 8,3 
Other non-financial company 5,6 2,8 2,8 0 
Venture capital company 5,6 13,9 8,3 0 
Refundable state (EU) 
support  
8,3 5,6 2,8 0 
Parent company 5,6 11,1 8,3 2,8 
Non-refundable support 33,3 41,7 33,3 19,4 
Short term bank loan 2,8 2,8 13,9 2,8 
Long term bank loan 5,6 11,1 8,3 8,3 
University 11,1 8,3 8,3 2,8 
Supplier 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,8 
Customer 16,7 16,7 16,7 16,7 
Source: own compilation 
Remark: more answers were acceptable 
 
The institutional venture capital does not mean general funding source for them, 
despite the fact that technology-oriented companies, in the same time spin-off 
companies with big expansion potential are more likely to receive venture capital 
than other companies.  
 
7.1. The institutional venture capital financing of the Hungarian spin-off companies 
 
The respondents indicated their experiences connected to venture capital financing 
in all different cases on a five-point scale (Table 2). Considering the average of the 
answers the highest value was reached by the variable indicating that the venture 
capital investors do not know enough about the given technology. The international 
competitiveness of the applied technologies do not mean problems in the aspect of 
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the growing of the companies as mentioned previously, but in the aspect of finding 
investors it doesn’t. The new nature of the technology may cause this information 
gap, therefore the venture capital investors do not know the applied technology, but 
if – not only in the owners’ opinion of realistically – the technology or the product is 
internationally competitive, there would probably be will from the venture capital 
investors’ side to finance the company. The availability of the venture capitals for the 
spin-off companies could be resolved through dissolution of the informational 
asymmetry.  
The venture capital investors do not like to invest small amounts, which is the second 
significant problem and a problem also confirmed in the international literature, is the 
venture capital investors moved in the direction of financing companies in later 
phases of growth or companies with bigger capital needs and mainly to out buying 
due to economics of scale reasons. The developed capital gap and informational 
asymmetry together result in a financing gap in the early stage (Becskyné, 2008; 
Freear et al., 2002; Freear et al., 1994; Freear and Sohl 2001). The financing gap 
could be overbridged through angel investors and through angel investors’ networks. 
The supply of venture capital of the spin-off companies is also trammeled by the high 
yield expectations of the investors, which is an internationally known an 
characteristic of the supply’s side similarly to the previously said, since usually the 
industry is characterized by great growth potential, aiming at international markets, 
promising high yield of investment when exiting (Karsai, 1997). On the demand side, 
namely from the companies’ view the most important problems arising are the fear 
of freedom of decision restraint, on the other hand they do not have adequate 
entrepreneurial and management skills. These are general problems in other 
countries, too, but as long as the change in approach does not happen, the spin-off 
companies cannot expect to receive higher venture capital financing than before.  
 
Table 2: The experiences of the Hungarian university spin-off companies in 
the field of venture capital financing 
 
Value Opinion 
4,0 The venture capital investors do not know enough about the given 
technology  
3,7 The venture capital investors do not like to invest small amounts  
3,6 The venture capital investors  have high yield expectations 
3,5 The involvement of venture capital investors  restricts the company 
leader(s)’ freedom of decision during the functioning of the company 
3,2 The venture capital investors  averse to financing seed, start-up or early 
stage companies  
2,9 The investment is hampered by the low quality business plan 
2,8 The investment is hampered by the lack of entrepreneurial, management 
skills  
2,7 The economic policy does not support enough the venture capital 
investments  
2,6 There is not enough information about the venture capital investors 
357 
2,6 The possibilities of exiting of the company for the venture capital 
investors are bad 
Source: own compilation 
 
 
7.2. The informal venture capital financing of the Hungarian university spin-off 
companies 
 
In the aspect of angel investors the respondents identified the biggest problem to be 
in the small number of angel investors and the lack of angel investor’s networks in 
Hungary (Table 3). So the angel investors are not the solution for the financial gap 
formed through institutional venture capital’s international tendency neither in the 
aspect of university spin-off companies. According to the respondents the economic 
policy’s insufficient support for angel investor nature investments is a significant 
burden. Government intervention on both demand and supply side could contribute 
to the efficient functioning of the informal venture capital segment and to the 
advantages of potential possibilities, but the government must not in any way take 
over the role of the angel investors (Karsai, 2002), namely it can only support the 
functioning of the industry indirectly, by improving the investment environment on 
the supply side, and by creating an entrepreneurial environment stimulating 
innovation on the demand side (Kosztopulosz - Makra, 2004). The change of 
entrepreneurial attitude, the change of approach of individuals having adequate 
capital for informal investments, and the creation of an entrepreneurial layer with 
management skills could lead to results in this area. 
The informative gap connected to angel investors means a similar problem to the 
respondents as in the case of institutional venture capital, but according to the 
international literature the informational asymmetry is intensified in this case, namely 
the companies seeking capital and the angel investors find each other even harder 
(Harding, 2002). Since the role of angel investors in Hungary is minimal, hence the 
biggest problem lies in the lack of angel investors and not in the efficiency of the 
industry’s functioning. The second step in the segment’s development is the 
development angel investors’ network, which could play an important role in 
overcoming the second financing gap ensuing from the redirection of formal capitals 
to later phases (Aernoudt, 2005). According to Wheatherby (2007) the financial gap 
is getting narrower in the western countries resulting from their market reactions, 
since the “super angels” and their groups overbridge the problem, and on the other 
hand the initial capital requirements of certain technology-oriented companies, 
especially of internet companies significantly dropped. 
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Table 3: The experience of the Hungarian university spin-off companies 
with angel investors  
 
Value Opinion 
4,7 There are only few angel investors in Hungary  
3,6 The angel investors’ networks (partner mediator organizations) are 
missing in Hungary 
3,6 The economic policy does not support sufficiently the angel investor 
nature investments  
3,1 The professionalism, expertise of the angel investors is insufficient 
3,1 The investment is trammeled by the lack of entrepreneurial and 
management skills of the company leaders seeking capital  
3,0 The exiting possibilities of the angel investors are limited 
2,6 The angel investors do not understand our company’s technology 
2,6 The quality of the business plan of the company seeking capital is 
unacceptable 
2,5 The company owner(s) do not wish to share to any extent their control 
over the company with an external party 
2,3 There is not enough information available on the role and characteristics 
of the angel investors 
1,9 The angel investor does not have the needed sum of capital 
1,9 The angel investors’ yield expectations are too high 
Source: own compilation 
 
7.3. Financing of the Hungarian university spin-off companies through application 
possibilities 
 
We could already see at the selection of financing methods based on 
lifecycle phases that the non-refundable state funding is one of the main resources 
of the spin-off companies, and as I mentioned already 62% of the respondents 
already received state or community funding. Most of the respondents find the 
application procedures too bureaucratic, but they believe that these fundings helped 
the development of their companies. According to the respondents the delay of the 
call for proposals and imbursements makes the planning and functioning of the 
companies difficult. The difficult implementation of obligatory commitments and the 
too high own contribution in the aspect of companies is moderately valid. The 
companies find it least important that the applications redirect the company’s focus 
from the markets and that the decision making processes are impenetrable and 
corrupt (Table 4). 
 
  
359 
Table 4: Experiences of Hungarian university spin-off companies with 
application procedures 
 
Value Possible answers 
4,2 The application procedures are too bureaucratic  
4,1 The funding through application helped the development of our company 
3,9 The eventuality and delay of call of proposals make planning difficult 
3,9 The delay of imbursement made the functioning and the development of 
our company difficult 
3,0 The obligatory commitments connected to the application are hardly 
implementable 
2,9 The required own contribution is too high 
2,6 The call for proposals redirect the company’s focus from the market work 
2,3 The decision making concerning of applications is impenetrable and corrupt  
Source: own compilation 
 
8. Summary 
Most of the Hungarian university spin-off companies included in the sample were 
established between 2004 and 2008. Parallel to the global economic crisis the 
propensity for spin-off company establishment dropped, in the past four years only 
two companies were established. Most of the spin-off companies are connected to 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry, as well as information communication 
technology among the knowledge-intensive activities. In the aspect of business 
activities for the companies the “business to business” model is more characteristic 
than the „business to consumer”. The main markets if selling are the ones in Asia, 
but Hungary is also a significant target.  
The biggest problems in the aspect of venture capital financing are the informational 
asymmetry and the shifting of the investors’ interest on later phases in the lifecycle. 
The companies find it hard to give up their independence in decision making and 
they are not ready for venture capital involvement, which impedes the realization of 
venture capital investments. The biggest obstructions of angel investments are the 
small number of professionally prepared angel investors in Hungary and the lack of 
angel investors’ networks, too. The biggest problems of application procedures are 
the overloaded bureaucracy and unpredictability.  
Summarizing all, the companies see their most important financing 
possibilities in applications and non-refundable sources, namely they expect from 
the government to directly support them with “soft” money. The companies primarily 
expect from the government to cover their capital needs for growth, even after the 
state financial resources dry out. The government on the other hand could support 
the faster growth of spin-off companies through the stimulation of both demand and 
supply side of the institutional and informal venture capital industry, and that growth 
would also contribute to the development of the national economy. 
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